competition-malware-config

Extract and decode malware configuration fields, beacon parameters, and staged payload boundaries in sandboxed CTF workflows.

7|4|Updated Jun 22, 2026
One-click install
npx skills add https://github.com/dbx0/skills --skill competition-malware-config-dbx0
Or copy as Structured Prompt for Agent
Please help me install this Agent Skill.
Skill: competition-malware-config
Source: https://github.com/dbx0/skills/tree/main/skills/malware-c2/analysis/competition-malware-config
Command: npx skills add https://github.com/dbx0/skills --skill competition-malware-config-dbx0

SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION & REQUIREMENTS

💡 This Skill includes references (resource) components.

What problem does it solve? Recovering a malware sample's hidden configuration—C2 addresses, bot IDs, campaign IDs, mutexes, and decode keys—is often the decisive step in CTF and sandbox analysis, but the config is usually buried behind layered encoding, encryption, and staged payloads. This Skill provides a structured methodology to locate the config boundary, reconstruct the full decode chain, and tie each recovered field to observable behavior. ## Core Features & Use Cases - Config Boundary Discovery: Systematically inspect sections, resources, overlays, embedded archives, registry seeds, and stage2 memory to find where configuration data lives and when it becomes plaintext. - Decode Chain Reconstruction: Recover the transform chain in order (container, compression, encoding, XOR/masks, crypto, parsing) while preserving offsets, hashes, keys, and IVs as evidence. - Behavior Correlation: Map each recovered field (beacon path, mutex, wallet, bot ID, campaign ID) to the branch or network behavior it controls, validated against PCAPs and process trees. - Use Case: During a CTF malware challenge, you receive a packed sample that beacons to an unknown host. Use this Skill to unpack the staged payload, decode the embedded config blob, and extract the C2 URL and campaign ID with a fully documented evidence trail. ## Quick Start After the ctf-sandbox-orchestrator has established sandbox assumptions, ask it to recover the malware config and decode the C2 beacon fields from the provided sample.

Frequently Asked Questions about competition-malware-config

High-intent search queries and answers about installing and using this skill.

FAQPage Schema
How do I extract a malware config from a packed sample?

Malware config extraction starts by locating the config boundary in resources, overlays, embedded archives, or stage2 memory. Then reconstruct the decode chain in order—container, compression, encoding, XOR or masks, crypto, and final parsing—while preserving offsets, keys, and hashes as evidence.

How to decode C2 beacon parameters from malware?

Decode C2 beacon parameters by identifying the decode helpers near network-related strings, then reversing the transform chain until the beacon path, host, and tasking route become plaintext. Correlate the decoded fields with PCAPs or observed network flows to confirm accuracy.

Can this skill be used without the ctf-sandbox-orchestrator?

No, this skill is designed as a downstream specialization and requires the ctf-sandbox-orchestrator to be active first. The orchestrator establishes sandbox assumptions, node ownership, and evidence priorities before routing to this config-recovery workflow.

What evidence should be preserved during malware config analysis?

Preserve the original artifact, unpacked layer, dumped stage, and parsed config as separate artifacts. Keep one compact block of offsets, hashes, decode helpers, keys, and masks, plus a second block mapping each parsed field to the branch or protocol step it influences.

Why does malware config extraction fail on staged payloads?

Extraction fails when analysts treat one IOC-looking string as the full config without proving the decode chain, or mix fields from separate decode paths. Staged samples require tracking exactly when each value becomes plaintext across loader, payload, and stage2 memory boundaries.