constant-time-analysis

To detect timing side-channel vulnerabilities, analyze your cryptographic code for variable-time instructions and secret-dependent branches across compiled code, bytecode, and scripting languages. This process identifies dangerous operations like division that leak secret data through execution timing variations.

Constant-time analysis is a security review that identifies timing leaks where secret data influences execution timing. You need it after implementing encryption algorithms to ensure resistance against side-channel attacks like KyberSlash, preventing attackers from extracting keys through timing observations.

Yes, you can scan for secret-dependent branches across Rust and C++, alongside C, Go, PHP, JavaScript, Python, Ruby, Java, Kotlin, C#, and Swift. The analysis operates on assembly, bytecode, and source code to find timing vulnerabilities in diverse architectures.

You integrate timing attack analysis into CI pipelines to run automated security checks on every code change. The analysis scans cryptographic implementations for variable-time instructions, providing constant-time fixes and preventing timing vulnerabilities from reaching production environments.

Detecting timing attacks in compiled code targets variable-time instructions directly in the assembly, while source code analysis identifies secret-dependent branches in the logic. Both compiled and scripting formats are supported, ensuring comprehensive vulnerability coverage across different compilation stages.