constant-time-analysis

Timing side-channel vulnerabilities in cryptographic code are detected by analyzing compiled assembly or bytecode for dangerous instructions like division on secrets, secret-dependent branches, and non-constant-time comparisons across multiple programming languages.

Constant-time analysis supports compiled languages including C, C++, Go, Rust, and Swift by examining assembly, plus VM-compiled languages like Java, Kotlin, C#, PHP, JavaScript, TypeScript, Python, and Ruby by examining bytecode.

You need to analyze code for timing attacks when implementing new encryption algorithms or reviewing existing code that handles private keys, ensuring no execution timing variations leak secret data and compromise system security.

To check C code for secret-dependent branches causing timing leaks, analyze the compiled assembly output to identify operations where execution paths or instructions vary based on secret values.

Constant-time analysis works with both compiled and VM-compiled languages by examining the generated assembly for compiled code like Rust and Swift, and inspecting the bytecode for VM-compiled code like Java and Python.

Operations that leak secret data through execution timing variations include division on secret values, secret-dependent branches, and non-constant-time comparisons, which can be exploited in sophisticated timing side-channel attacks.