corporate-governance-analysis

Assess corporate control structures and price the value of management change.

Updated Sep 9, 2026
One-click install
npx skills add https://github.com/lyndonkl/hermesworld --skill corporate-governance-analysis-lyndonkl
Or copy as Structured Prompt for Agent
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Skill: corporate-governance-analysis
Source: https://github.com/lyndonkl/hermesworld/tree/main/packages/company-diagnostician/skills/corporate-finance/corporate-governance-analysis
Command: npx skills add https://github.com/lyndonkl/hermesworld --skill corporate-governance-analysis-lyndonkl

SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION & REQUIREMENTS

💡 This Skill includes references (resource) components.

What problem does it solve? Analysts often treat governance as a vague discount or a checklist score, which hides how weak boards actually destroy value. This Skill fixes the firm's true objective function, maps who really controls it, and converts governance findings into a priced probability of management change. ## Core Features & Use Cases - Objective Function Setting: Runs the four-link test (managers vs stockholders, stockholders vs lenders, firms vs markets, firms vs society) and the (T, E, B) matrix to decide whether stock price maximization is legitimate. - Ownership and Control Mapping: Computes economic stakes, voting stakes, control wedges, group totals, and look-through interests for dual-class, pyramid, and shell structures, then identifies the marginal investor. - Value of Control Pricing: Values the firm under status quo and restructured management, then derives the expected value of control and the market-implied probability of change. - Use Case: Before valuing a family-controlled company with a staggered board, use this Skill to determine who controls the firm, whether market beta is legitimate, and what a hostile discipline scenario is worth per share. ## Quick Start Analyze the governance of this publicly traded company and estimate the probability that its current management gets replaced.

Frequently Asked Questions about corporate-governance-analysis

High-intent search queries and answers about installing and using this skill.

FAQPage Schema
How do I value corporate control in a valuation?

Value the firm twice: once as currently managed and once under named policy changes across the four levers of cash flows, growth, growth period length, and cost of capital. The value of control is the difference, and the expected value multiplies it by the probability of management change.

How do I identify the marginal investor of a stock?

The marginal investor is the holder most likely to trade next, not the largest holder. Classify institutional and insider ownership percentages; a diversified institutional marginal investor justifies market beta, while an undiversified one requires a total beta adjustment.

When is stock price maximization the right objective?

Stock price maximization is legitimate only when the firm is publicly traded and liquid, markets price the stock reasonably well, and lenders are protected by covenants. Otherwise the objective shifts to stockholder wealth or firm value maximization.

Should weak governance be a discount rate adjustment?

No. Weak governance enters the model through lower return on capital, value-destroying reinvestment, static financing policy, and a low probability of change. An arbitrary discount rate haircut hides every one of those channels and cannot be defended.

What are the limitations of board independence tests?

The CalPERS tests are necessary but not sufficient, since a board can pass all three and still rubber-stamp management. Cross-sectional evidence shows investor-protection provisions predict value while board composition barely does, so examine actual board behavior and decisions.