deploying-active-directory-honeytokens

Deploys Active Directory honeytokens and SIEM detection rules for deception-based threat detection.

954|172|Updated Mar 13, 2026
One-click install
npx skills add https://github.com/xalgord/xalgorix --skill deploying-active-directory-honeytokens
Or copy as Structured Prompt for Agent
Please help me install this Agent Skill.
Skill: deploying-active-directory-honeytokens
Source: https://github.com/xalgord/xalgorix/tree/main/internal/tools/skills/data/deception-technology/deploying-active-directory-honeytokens
Command: npx skills add https://github.com/xalgord/xalgorix --skill deploying-active-directory-honeytokens

SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION & REQUIREMENTS

What problem does it solve?

Signature-based detection often misses novel Active Directory attacks like Kerberoasting, credential theft, and BloodHound-driven reconnaissance. This Skill deploys deception-based honeytokens that generate high-fidelity, near-zero-false-positive alerts whenever an attacker interacts with decoy AD objects.

Core Features & Use Cases

  • Fake Privileged Accounts: Creates aged, realistic decoy admin accounts with AdminCount=1 to detect credential dumping and lateral movement.
  • Honeyroasting SPNs: Registers fake Service Principal Names so any Kerberos TGS request (Event ID 4769) against them is definitively malicious.
  • Decoy GPOs & BloodHound Paths: Plants cpassword traps in SYSVOL and fake ACL attack paths to detect GPP password harvesting and mislead graph-based reconnaissance.
  • SIEM Detection Rules: Generates Splunk SPL, Microsoft Sentinel KQL, and Sigma rules monitoring Event IDs 4769, 4625, 4662, and 5136.
  • Use Case: A blue team wants early warning of Kerberoasting in their domain. They deploy a honeytoken service account with a fake MSSQLSvc SPN, then alert on any TGS request for it, catching attackers during reconnaissance before any real damage occurs.

Quick Start

Deploy a full Active Directory honeytoken suite with fake admin accounts, SPNs, and decoy GPOs, then generate Splunk detection rules for my domain corp.example.com.

Frequently Asked Questions about deploying-active-directory-honeytokens

High-intent search queries and answers about installing and using this skill.

FAQPage Schema
How do I detect Kerberoasting attacks in Active Directory?

Deploy a honeytoken account with a fake SPN and monitor Windows Event ID 4769 for TGS requests targeting that ServiceName. Since the SPN serves no real service, any ticket request is definitively malicious and can be alerted on with near-zero false positives.

How to create honeytoken accounts in Active Directory with PowerShell?

Use the ActiveDirectory PowerShell module to create a decoy account with realistic naming, aged creation and password dates, and AdminCount=1 set. The Skill's Deploy-ADHoneytokens.ps1 module automates this via New-HoneytokenAdmin with configurable OU placement and password length.

What Windows Event IDs detect honeytoken interaction?

Key events are 4769 (Kerberos TGS request) for honeyroasting, 4625 (failed logon) for decoy credential use, 4662 (directory object access) for DACL reads on honey users, and 5136 (object modification) for decoy GPO tampering. These must be forwarded to a SIEM for alerting.

Does this work with Splunk and Microsoft Sentinel?

Yes, the Skill generates detection rules for Splunk (SPL), Microsoft Sentinel (KQL), and Sigma format. It requires Windows Event Log forwarding from domain controllers to the SIEM so honeytoken-related events reach the detection rules.

Why do attackers ignore or detect my honeytoken accounts?

Honeytokens fail when they look unrealistic, such as brand-new accounts with matching creation, last-logon, and password dates or obvious names like HONEYPOT. Make dates internally consistent and aged, use naming matching real service accounts, and set AdminCount=1 to appear legitimate.

What privileges are needed to deploy AD honeytokens?

Domain Admin or delegated AD administration privileges are required to create accounts, register SPNs, and create GPOs. You also need Group Policy Management Console access and a SIEM with Windows Event Log forwarding already configured.