What problem does it solve?
Adversaries place malicious DLLs alongside legitimate signed applications to hijack execution flow and evade defenses, and standard signature checks often miss these attacks. This Skill provides a structured threat-hunting workflow to identify DLL side-loading (MITRE ATT&CK T1574.002) before it becomes a persistent foothold.
Core Features & Use Cases
- DLL Load Monitoring: Query Sysmon Event ID 7 and EDR telemetry (CrowdStrike, MDE, SentinelOne) for DLLs loaded outside expected application directories.
- Signature and Hash Verification: Flag unsigned or untrusted DLLs loaded by signed executables and compare hashes against known-good baselines and threat intel.
- Path Anomaly Detection: Identify legitimate executables running from user-writable locations like %APPDATA%, %TEMP%, or C:\ProgramData that act as decoy wrappers.
- Use Case: During incident response, hunt for APT persistence by diffing the loaded-module set of known LOLBAS targets like OneDriveStandaloneUpdater.exe against a clean baseline to find sideloaded payloads.
Quick Start
Hunt for DLL side-loading on my endpoints by analyzing Sysmon Event ID 7 logs for unsigned DLLs loaded from unusual paths by signed applications.