exploiting-integer-overflow-vulnerabilities

Detect and exploit integer overflow, underflow, truncation, and signedness bugs in native code during authorized assessments.

954|172|Updated Mar 13, 2026
One-click install
npx skills add https://github.com/xalgord/xalgorix --skill exploiting-integer-overflow-vulnerabilities
Or copy as Structured Prompt for Agent
Please help me install this Agent Skill.
Skill: exploiting-integer-overflow-vulnerabilities
Source: https://github.com/xalgord/xalgorix/tree/main/internal/tools/skills/data/binary-exploitation/exploiting-integer-overflow-vulnerabilities
Command: npx skills add https://github.com/xalgord/xalgorix --skill exploiting-integer-overflow-vulnerabilities

SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION & REQUIREMENTS

What problem does it solve?

Integer arithmetic bugs in C/C++/Rust/Go binaries are easy to overlook because the wrap itself is invisible — the real damage happens downstream when a wrapped value sizes an allocation, copy, or bounds check. This Skill provides a systematic methodology for tracing attacker-controlled integers to dangerous sinks, computing wrapping inputs, and proving exploitability with a working overflow chain.

Core Features & Use Cases

  • Sink Mapping: Identify where attacker-controlled integers feed malloc, memcpy, read, loop bounds, or array indexes, tracking type widths and signedness at each step.
  • Wrap Input Computation: Calculate exact inputs that trigger overflow, underflow, truncation, or signedness confusion (e.g. count=2^32 truncating a 64-bit product to a 32-byte allocation).
  • Confirmed Exploitation: Trigger undersized-allocation/oversized-copy chains, verify corruption of adjacent targets (privilege flags, heap metadata, stack buffers), and escalate to authorization bypass or RCE.
  • Use Case: During an authorized audit of a binary that parses a count/element-size pair, use this methodology to show that count=4294967296 truncates the allocation to 32 bytes while the copy uses the full value, overwriting an adjacent is_admin flag and producing a privilege-escalation proof for the report.

Quick Start

Analyze the target binary for integer arithmetic feeding allocations or copies, then follow the workflow to compute a wrapping input and demonstrate the downstream overflow with a pwntools proof of concept.

Frequently Asked Questions about exploiting-integer-overflow-vulnerabilities

High-intent search queries and answers about installing and using this skill.

FAQPage Schema
How do I find integer overflow vulnerabilities in C binaries?

Grep for arithmetic feeding malloc, calloc, memcpy, memmove, or read calls, then trace each attacker-controlled integer's type width and signedness. Compile a probe with -fsanitize=integer or UBSan to get a runtime report at the exact overflowing operation.

How to exploit integer overflow to heap overflow?

Compute an input that wraps the allocation size small while the copy length stays large, such as count=2^32 truncating a 64-bit product to 32 bytes. Send the wrapping input with pwntools, overflow into the adjacent structure, and verify the target field (like an is_admin flag) changed.

What tools detect integer overflow at runtime?

UBSan with -fsanitize=signed-integer-overflow,unsigned-integer-overflow pinpoints the exact operation in C/C++. For Go, the go-panikint forked toolchain panics on wrap, and gdb with pwndbg or GEF lets you inspect computed sizes versus copy lengths in a debugger.

Does integer overflow happen in Go and Rust?

Yes. Go wraps silently with no overflow panic by default, and Rust wraps in release builds unless checked or overflowing arithmetic is used. Both languages need explicit checked arithmetic or instrumentation to surface wrap bugs.

Why is an integer underflow dangerous in size calculations?

An unsigned subtraction like total_len - HEADER with total_len smaller than HEADER wraps to a value near SIZE_MAX, turning a shrink operation into an unbounded copy. The downstream reader or writer then operates far past the intended buffer boundary.

When is an integer overflow not exploitable?

A wrap is only exploitable when the wrapped value reaches a dangerous sink such as an allocation size, copy length, loop bound, or array index. If the overflowed integer never influences memory operations or bounds checks, it has no security impact.