fault-tree-builder

Construct fault trees with minimal cut set extraction and probability validation.

3|2|Updated Jan 23, 2026
One-click install
npx skills add https://github.com/robotijn/ctoc --skill fault-tree-builder
Or copy as Structured Prompt for Agent
Please help me install this Agent Skill.
Skill: fault-tree-builder
Source: https://github.com/robotijn/ctoc/tree/main/skills/safety/fault-tree-builder
Command: npx skills add https://github.com/robotijn/ctoc --skill fault-tree-builder

SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION & REQUIREMENTS

What problem does it solve?

This Skill eliminates the risk of non-compliant, incomplete fault tree analysis for safety-critical systems, which is a mandatory requirement for regulatory certifications including ISO 26262 ASIL D, IEC 61508 SIL 3, and RTCA DO-178C Level A. Manual fault tree construction often misses minimal cut sets, fails to document independence assumptions, or produces inconsistent probability values that invalidate safety claims.

Core Features & Use Cases

  • Top-down deductive tree construction: Build fault trees from undesired top events using AND, OR, voting, and inhibit gates per IEC 61025, with documented independence arguments for all AND gates.
  • Minimal cut set extraction: Automatically identify single points of failure and high-risk failure combinations to prioritize redundancy and mitigation efforts.
  • Quantitative safety validation: Roll up basic event probabilities to calculate top event probability and validate against tolerable hazard rate thresholds from safety goals.
  • Cross-artifact consistency checks: Reuse failure-in-time values from linked FMEDA artifacts and align basic events with threat model findings to avoid conflicting safety data.
  • Use Case: For an automotive brake control system targeting ASIL D, use this Skill to build a fault tree for the "uncontrolled brake release" top event, extract minimal cut sets, and confirm the top event probability meets the safety goal's 1e-8 per hour tolerable hazard rate.

Quick Start

Use the fault-tree-builder skill to construct a fault tree for the undesired top event "uncontrolled brake release" from the system architecture and linked ASIL D safety goal, then extract minimal cut sets and validate the top event probability against the tolerable hazard rate.

Frequently Asked Questions about fault-tree-builder

High-intent search queries and answers about installing and using this skill.

FAQPage Schema
How do I build a fault tree for ISO 26262 ASIL D safety validation?

Build a compliant fault tree for ISO 26262 ASIL D safety validation by constructing top-down deductive trees from undesired top events using AND, OR, voting, and inhibit gates per IEC 61025. You then extract minimal cut sets and roll up basic event probabilities to validate against tolerable hazard rate thresholds.

What is minimal cut set extraction in fault tree analysis?

Minimal cut set extraction in fault tree analysis is the automated identification of single points of failure and high-risk failure combinations. It prioritizes redundancy and mitigation efforts by isolating the specific basic event groupings that can independently trigger the top undesired event.

Can I reuse failure mode data from FMEDA artifacts in fault tree construction?

Yes, you can reuse failure-in-time values from linked FMEDA artifacts during fault tree construction. Cross-artifact consistency checks automatically align basic events with FMEDA data and threat model findings to prevent conflicting safety data across your safety-critical system documentation.

Does this fault tree analysis approach support IEC 61508 SIL 3 and DO-178C Level A certifications?

Yes, this fault tree analysis approach supports IEC 61508 SIL 3 and RTCA DO-178C Level A certifications. It generates compliant, traceable top-down deductive analysis with documented independence arguments and common-cause failure mitigation required for regulatory approval.

How do I document independence arguments for AND gates in safety-critical fault trees?

Document independence arguments for AND gates in safety-critical fault trees by applying traceable top-down deductive analysis per IEC 61025. The process requires explicit independence documentation for all AND gates to validate redundancy claims and satisfy regulatory certification requirements.

What's the best way to calculate top event probability for an automotive brake control system?

Calculate top event probability for an automotive brake control system by rolling up basic event probabilities through the fault tree structure. Validate the resulting top event probability against the safety goal's tolerable hazard rate threshold, such as a 1e-8 per hour rate for uncontrolled brake release.