hunt-ato

Enumerate and validate 9+ account takeover attack paths for web applications.

1.1k|191|Updated Jun 24, 2026
One-click install
npx skills add https://github.com/uphiago/recon-skills --skill hunt-ato-uphiago
Or copy as Structured Prompt for Agent
Please help me install this Agent Skill.
Skill: hunt-ato
Source: https://github.com/uphiago/recon-skills/tree/main/redteam/hunt-ato
Command: npx skills add https://github.com/uphiago/recon-skills --skill hunt-ato-uphiago

SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION & REQUIREMENTS

What problem does it solve?

This skill solves the problem of incomplete or low-severity account takeover findings during penetration tests by providing a complete taxonomy of 9+ distinct ATO attack paths, chaining guidance, and validation steps to demonstrate full, reproducible takeover of a second test account for critical severity ratings.

Core Features & Use Cases

  • 9 Distinct ATO Attack Paths: Covers password reset poisoning, token leaks via Referer, predictable reset tokens, email change without re-authentication, JWT manipulation, password change without step-up, security question abuse, SSO subdomain takeover at OAuth redirect_uri, and OAuth device code flow abuse.
  • Attack Chaining Patterns: Combines low-severity primitives (e.g., cookie theft + no-step-up password change) to demonstrate persistent, full account takeover of a victim account you do not control.
  • Validation & Severity Guidance: Includes out-of-band confirmation steps, false-positive mitigation checks, and clear severity gating to ensure findings are accepted by bug bounty platforms and clients. Use case: A pentester testing a client's OAuth implementation can use this skill to identify a lax redirect_uri validation flaw, chain it with a dangling subdomain takeover, and demonstrate full ATO of a test account to earn a critical severity bounty.

Quick Start

Use the hunt-ato skill to enumerate all possible account takeover paths for the target application, validate each finding with out-of-band confirmation, and chain primitives to demonstrate full takeover of a second test account for a critical severity rating.

Frequently Asked Questions about hunt-ato

High-intent search queries and answers about installing and using this skill.

FAQPage Schema
How do I chain low-severity account takeover vulnerabilities into critical findings?

Account takeover chaining combines low-severity primitives like cookie theft and no-step-up password changes to demonstrate persistent, full takeover of a victim account. This approach validates attack paths using out-of-band confirmation to achieve critical severity ratings.

What are the most common OAuth account takeover attack paths in web applications?

Common OAuth account takeover paths include lax redirect_uri validation, dangling subdomain takeover at the redirect_uri, and OAuth device code flow abuse. These vulnerabilities allow attackers to intercept authorization codes and fully compromise victim accounts.

How do I validate password reset poisoning vulnerabilities to avoid false positives?

Password reset poisoning validation requires out-of-band confirmation steps and false-positive mitigation checks. You must demonstrate reproducible account takeover of a second test account to ensure findings are accepted by bug bounty platforms and clients.

Can I use JWT manipulation to achieve full account takeover during a pentest?

JWT manipulation can achieve account takeover by altering token claims to impersonate victims. This skill provides taxonomy covering JWT manipulation alongside eight other distinct ATO primitives for comprehensive penetration testing coverage.

Does this account takeover testing approach work for SSO systems and API endpoints?

Account takeover testing applies to SSO systems and API endpoints where high-impact risks exist. The methodology covers OAuth implementations, web applications, and API endpoints with reproducible validation steps for critical-severity findings.

Why are my account takeover findings rated low severity during penetration tests?

Account takeover findings often receive low severity ratings when testers lack comprehensive attack chaining and out-of-band validation. Using a complete taxonomy of nine distinct ATO primitives with reproducible demo accounts ensures critical severity acceptance.