hunt-subdomain

Detect and validate subdomain takeover vulnerabilities across cloud and SaaS provider fingerprints.

10|3|Updated Aug 10, 2026
One-click install
npx skills add https://github.com/baiqigo/baiqi-redteam-lab --skill hunt-subdomain-baiqigo
Or copy as Structured Prompt for Agent
Please help me install this Agent Skill.
Skill: hunt-subdomain
Source: https://github.com/baiqigo/baiqi-redteam-lab/tree/main/.agents/skills/hunt-subdomain
Command: npx skills add https://github.com/baiqigo/baiqi-redteam-lab --skill hunt-subdomain-baiqigo

SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION & REQUIREMENTS

What problem does it solve? Subdomain takeover bugs are easy to miss and hard to prove: dangling CNAME records pointing to deprovisioned services (GitHub Pages, S3, Heroku, Zendesk, Vercel, Azure cloudapp) require provider-specific fingerprints and a claimability proof before a bug bounty report is accepted. This Skill provides the enumeration workflow, fingerprint catalog, and impact-escalation chains needed to turn a stale DNS record into a validated, high-severity finding. ## Core Features & Use Cases - Provider Fingerprint Detection: Match CNAME targets and HTTP error strings against known-vulnerable services including Fastly, S3, GitHub/GitLab Pages, Heroku, Shopify, UserVoice, Zendesk, Vercel, and Azure cloudapp regional pools. - Step-by-Step Hunting Methodology: Enumerate subdomains with subfinder/amass/assetfinder, resolve with dnsx, scan with subjack and nuclei takeover templates, then manually verify claimability before reporting. - Five Impact-Escalation Chains: Evaluate every takeover against OAuth redirect_uri allowlists, parent-domain cookie scope, CSP script-src allowlists, CORS regexes, and DKIM/SPF email DNS to escalate from Low to Critical severity. - Use Case: You find feedback.example.com CNAME'd to an unclaimed Zendesk host. The Skill walks you through registering the resource, proving control with a unique marker, then checking whether the subdomain sits in the OAuth redirect allowlist or shares .example.com cookies to demonstrate account-takeover impact. ## Quick Start Use the hunt-subdomain skill to check the subdomains of my authorized bug bounty target for takeover vulnerabilities and validate any dangling CNAME records you find.

Frequently Asked Questions about hunt-subdomain

High-intent search queries and answers about installing and using this skill.

FAQPage Schema
How do I find subdomain takeover vulnerabilities on a bug bounty target?

Enumerate subdomains with subfinder, amass, and assetfinder, then resolve CNAME records with dnsx. Flag CNAMEs pointing to third-party providers whose targets return NXDOMAIN, and scan with subjack or nuclei takeover templates to match known-vulnerable fingerprints.

What DNS and HTTP fingerprints indicate a subdomain is takeoverable?

Look for CNAMEs to github.io, gitlab.io, fastly.net, herokudns.com, s3.amazonaws.com, zendesk.com, or cname.vercel-dns.com combined with provider error strings like "There isn't a GitHub Pages site here", "NoSuchBucket", or "Fastly error: unknown domain".

subjack vs nuclei for subdomain takeover detection?

subjack performs fast bulk fingerprint matching against a fingerprints.json file with SSL support, while nuclei uses community takeover templates with severity ratings. Running both cross-validates results and reduces false positives before manual verification.

Why is a subdomain takeover alone usually rated low severity?

Defacement of a non-critical subdomain has limited impact, so triagers downgrade standalone takeovers. Escalate by demonstrating OAuth redirect_uri abuse, parent-domain cookie theft, CSP script-src injection, CORS credentialed reads, or DKIM/SPF email spoofing chains.

How do I prove a subdomain takeover for a bug bounty report?

Claim the unclaimed resource (bucket, Pages repo, Zendesk trial, Vercel project) and publish a minimal page with your researcher handle and timestamp. Screenshot the content served on the target subdomain, document the CNAME chain, and never serve malicious content.

Can subdomain takeover lead to full account takeover?

Yes, when the taken-over host appears in an OAuth redirect_uri allowlist, shares parent-domain cookies via Domain=.target.com, or is trusted in CSP script-src. Documented cases include Azure cloudapp takeovers chained to wildcard visualstudio.com OAuth reply_to for one-click ATO.