What problem does it solve?
DCSync attacks let adversaries extract password hashes from Active Directory by abusing replication rights, and they are invisible without the right audit configuration and detection logic. This Skill provides a structured threat-hunting workflow to surface unauthorized DS-Replication-Get-Changes requests from non-domain-controller accounts.
Core Features & Use Cases
- Event 4662 Analysis: Filter Windows Security Event ID 4662 with AccessMask 0x100 for the DS-Replication-Get-Changes and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All GUIDs.
- Non-DC Source Identification: Flag replication requests where the subject account is not a legitimate domain controller machine account, with guidance on whitelisting Azure AD Connect and backup tools.
- Detection Gap Validation: Verify SACL and audit policy prerequisites, and validate the hunt fires using Mimikatz lsadump::dcsync or Impacket secretsdump.py.
- Use Case: During incident response after a suspected AD compromise, run this hunt to identify whether an attacker performed DCSync from a non-DC host, then disable the account and reset krbtgt.
Quick Start
Hunt for DCSync activity in our environment by analyzing Windows Event ID 4662 for replication requests from non-domain-controller accounts.