What problem does it solve?
Ransomware operators and attackers routinely delete Volume Shadow Copies to prevent system recovery before encryption, and security teams need a structured way to hunt for this behavior across vssadmin, WMIC, PowerShell, and WMI-based deletion vectors that evade simple process-name detection.
Core Features & Use Cases
- Multi-vector detection coverage: Hunts vssadmin delete shadows, wmic shadowcopy delete, PowerShell Win32_ShadowCopy removal, bcdedit recovery disabling, and direct VSS COM API calls that spawn no child process.
- Evasion-aware guidance: Matches on command-line arguments and OriginalFileName rather than image names, and covers no-process deletions via WMI-Activity events 5857/5861.
- Use Case: During a ransomware readiness assessment, run the hunt workflow against Sysmon and Windows Security Event logs in Splunk or Sentinel to find shadow copy deletion preceding encryption, then validate coverage with Atomic Red Team T1490 tests.
Quick Start
Hunt for shadow copy deletion activity across my Windows fleet using Sysmon and Security event logs and report any vssadmin, wmic, or PowerShell-based deletion attempts.