local-ipc-auth

Validate kernel peer credentials on Unix socket connections for privileged IPC writes.

3|3|Updated Apr 13, 2026
One-click install
npx skills add https://github.com/quaid-app/quaid --skill local-ipc-auth
Or copy as Structured Prompt for Agent
Please help me install this Agent Skill.
Skill: local-ipc-auth
Source: https://github.com/quaid-app/quaid/tree/main/.squad/skills/local-ipc-auth
Command: npx skills add https://github.com/quaid-app/quaid --skill local-ipc-auth

SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION & REQUIREMENTS

What problem does it solve?

Local IPC that forwards privileged writes is vulnerable when relying on protocol identity alone. This pattern uses kernel-backed peer credentials as the authority and treats protocol identity as a cross-check to mitigate spoofing risk.

Core Features & Use Cases

  • Kernel-level peer credential validation on Unix sockets to establish trust.
  • Per-connection verification of socket owner/mode and peer UID/PID.
  • Safe endpoint publish/unpublish and cleanup on startup/shutdown to prevent stale coordinates.
  • Use Case: A CLI daemon that exposes privileged operations over a Unix socket, ensuring only the authenticated client can perform writes.

Quick Start

Configure a local daemon-client pair to require peer-credentials for privileged operations.

Frequently Asked Questions about local-ipc-auth

High-intent search queries and answers about installing and using this skill.

FAQPage Schema
What is peer credential validation for local IPC?

Peer credential validation is a kernel-backed mechanism for local IPC that verifies the UID and PID of connecting clients over Unix sockets to prevent same-UID spoofing. It establishes trust at the kernel level rather than relying on protocol identity alone.

How do I secure a CLI daemon over Unix sockets against unauthorized access?

To secure a CLI daemon over Unix sockets, enforce per-connection peer credential checks on every accept and audit socket-level permissions. This ensures only authenticated clients can perform privileged writes by verifying peer UID/PID continuously.

Why does protocol identity alone fail for privileged local IPC?

Protocol identity fails for privileged local IPC because it is vulnerable to same-UID spoofing races. Relying on kernel-backed peer credentials as the authority and treating protocol identity as a cross-check mitigates this spoofing risk.

Can I use Unix socket peer credentials to prevent same-UID spoofing?

Yes, you can use Unix socket peer credentials to prevent same-UID spoofing. The pattern requires per-connection peer UID checks and continuous peer verification on every accept to enforce kernel-backed authority for privileged writes.

What are the limitations of relying on protocol identity for daemon security?

Relying on protocol identity for daemon security is limited because it cannot prevent unauthorized access during a same-UID spoofing race. Kernel peer credential validation is required to establish trust and safely audit socket owner/mode on every connection.

Does this local IPC trust model handle socket cleanup on shutdown?

Yes, this local IPC trust model handles socket cleanup on shutdown. It satisfies endpoint publish and unpublish discipline by removing stale socket coordinates during startup and shutdown to prevent unauthorized access.