rsa-attack-techniques

Recover RSA plaintexts by identifying weak parameters and applying cryptanalytic attacks.

120|8|Updated Jun 2, 2026
One-click install
npx skills add https://github.com/Prohao42/aimy-sikll --skill rsa-attack-techniques-prohao42
Or copy as Structured Prompt for Agent
Please help me install this Agent Skill.
Skill: rsa-attack-techniques
Source: https://github.com/Prohao42/aimy-sikll/tree/main/ai-mian/hack-skills/skills/rsa-attack-techniques
Command: npx skills add https://github.com/Prohao42/aimy-sikll --skill rsa-attack-techniques-prohao42

SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION & REQUIREMENTS

What problem does it solve?

RSA plaintext recovery under weak cryptographic configurations and misconfigurations, enabling rapid assessment of cryptographic resilience.

Core Features & Use Cases

  • Enumerates factorization strategies for small moduli, small-exponent attacks, common modulus, and padding oracles.
  • Covers lattice-based methods (Wiener, Boneh-Durfee, Coppersmith) and practical fault/information-leak exploits.
  • Use Case: A security tester needs to determine whether a given RSA deployment is vulnerable to simple factorization or padding oracle leaks and document the risk.

Quick Start

Provide RSA parameters (n, e, c) and request the system to select and apply the most appropriate attack to recover the plaintext.

Frequently Asked Questions about rsa-attack-techniques

High-intent search queries and answers about installing and using this skill.

FAQPage Schema
How do I recover plaintext from an RSA ciphertext using small public exponent attacks?

RSA plaintext recovery from small public exponent attacks involves exploiting low public exponents to directly compute roots or apply lattice reduction techniques like Coppersmith's method when message padding is insufficient.

What is the best way to factorize small RSA moduli during a CTF cryptanalysis challenge?

Factorizing small RSA moduli requires applying direct factorization algorithms to the integer n, allowing you to reconstruct the private key and decrypt the ciphertext when weak parameters are present.

Can padding oracle attacks be used to decrypt RSA ciphertexts without the private key?

Yes, padding oracle attacks exploit error information leaked during RSA decryption processes to iteratively recover plaintext bytes, bypassing the need for the private key when the system leaks padding validity.

When do I need continued fractions to attack RSA public-key cryptography configurations?

Continued fractions are needed for RSA attacks like Wiener's method, which exploits small private exponents by approximating the ratio between the public exponent and modulus to recover the private key.

Does this RSA attack analysis support common modulus scenarios where multiple ciphertexts share the same n?

Yes, common modulus scenarios are supported, allowing the extraction of plaintext when the same RSA modulus is used with different public exponents, enabling a mathematical attack without factorization.

What are the limitations of lattice reduction for RSA cryptanalysis?

Lattice reduction methods for RSA cryptanalysis are limited by the size of the vulnerable parameters and require significant mathematical tooling, making them ineffective against properly configured RSA with large, random keys.