rsa-attack-techniques

Recover RSA plaintexts, factors, or signatures from weak keys and oracle leaks.

11|4|Updated Jun 7, 2026
One-click install
npx skills add https://github.com/sayseven7/frameseven --skill rsa-attack-techniques-sayseven7
Or copy as Structured Prompt for Agent
Please help me install this Agent Skill.
Skill: rsa-attack-techniques
Source: https://github.com/sayseven7/frameseven/tree/main/internal/mcp/skills/rsa-attack-techniques
Command: npx skills add https://github.com/sayseven7/frameseven --skill rsa-attack-techniques-sayseven7

SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION & REQUIREMENTS

What problem does it solve?

This Skill helps recover RSA plaintexts, private factors, or signatures when the cryptosystem is weakened by small exponents, shared moduli, oracle leaks, close primes, poor padding, or faulty CRT implementations.

Core Features & Use Cases

  • Attack selection: Matches the observed RSA parameters and side channels to the correct method, including direct factorization, Fermat, Pollard p-1, cube-root attacks, Hastad broadcast, Wiener, Boneh-Durfee, Coppersmith, common modulus, LSB oracle, Bleichenbacher, and CRT fault attacks.
  • Cryptanalytic execution: Provides practical Python and SageMath-style approaches for computing factors, recovering plaintexts, and validating candidate results.
  • Use cases: Ideal for CTF challenges, lab exercises, and authorized security reviews where the goal is to break weak RSA rather than build it.

Quick Start

Use the rsa-attack-techniques skill to inspect the given RSA inputs, identify the most likely attack path, and recover the plaintext or private factors with validation.

Frequently Asked Questions about rsa-attack-techniques

High-intent search queries and answers about installing and using this skill.

FAQPage Schema
How do I recover RSA plaintext from a small public exponent in a CTF challenge?

To recover RSA plaintext from a small public exponent, you can apply a cube-root attack or Hastad broadcast method. This Skill selects the valid attack path based on your exact RSA parameters and computes the plaintext with result verification.

What is the best way to factor RSA moduli when primes are close together?

Factoring RSA moduli with close primes is best handled using the Fermat factorization method. This cryptanalysis Skill automatically matches your parameters to Fermat or Pollard p-1 approaches to compute the private factors.

Can I use lattice methods like Coppersmith to find RSA small exponent vulnerabilities?

Yes, Coppersmith lattice methods are supported for exploiting RSA small exponent vulnerabilities. The Skill provides SageMath-style approaches to compute hidden plaintext bits or partial factors when given exact RSA parameters.

How does a padding oracle attack work against RSA decryption?

A padding oracle attack like Bleichenbacher exploits server responses to iteratively recover RSA plaintexts. This Skill applies padding or parity oracle techniques to extract plaintexts when an oracle leak is present in the cryptosystem.

Do I need exact RSA parameters to perform a Wiener attack on a small private exponent?

Yes, you need exact RSA parameters like the public modulus and exponent to execute a Wiener attack. The Skill requires these exact inputs to select the mathematically valid attack path and recover the private key.

Why does shared modulus reuse allow RSA private factor recovery?

Shared modulus reuse allows RSA private factor recovery because mathematical relationships between multiple public keys expose the prime factors. This Skill applies the common modulus attack to compute factors when the same modulus is reused across keys.