sandboxing

To securely isolate untrusted code execution across Linux, Windows, and macOS, you need a sandboxing approach that combines namespaces, seccomp-bpf, and AppArmor or SELinux. This restricts syscalls, limits resources via cgroups, and enforces security policies to prevent access to sensitive host resources.

Preventing untrusted processes from accessing sensitive host resources requires process isolation combined with syscall filtering. By applying seccomp-bpf and container security contexts, you minimize the attack surface and restrict the system calls an untrusted process can make.

Seccomp-bpf limits syscalls for sandboxed applications by filtering the system calls a process can invoke at the kernel level. This syscall filtering minimizes the attack surface, ensuring untrusted code cannot execute privileged or dangerous operations within the sandbox.

Yes, you can use namespaces and cgroups to enforce resource limits on user-submitted code. Namespaces provide process isolation while cgroups enforce CPU, memory, and network constraints, preventing denial-of-service attacks and restricting access to host resources.

You need AppArmor or SELinux security policies when running untrusted code that requires defense-in-depth and least privilege principles. These mandatory access control systems enforce fail-secure policies for high-risk operations by restricting process capabilities beyond standard isolation.

Container security contexts for process isolation are limited if not combined with seccomp-bpf and cgroups. Relying solely on container boundaries may not fully restrict syscalls or enforce resource constraints, so a defense-in-depth approach is required to safely execute untrusted plugins.