What problem does it solve?
Spawned agents have read access to the repository, including .env files containing live credentials. If an agent reads secrets and writes them to .squad/ files (decisions, logs, history), Scribe auto-commits them to git, exposing them in remote history. This skill codifies absolute prohibitions and safe alternatives.
Core Features & Use Cases
Prohibited File Reads
NEVER read these files:
- .env (production secrets)
- .env.local (local dev secrets)
- .env.production (production environment)
- .env.development (development environment)
- .env.staging (staging environment)
- .env.test (test environment with real credentials)
- Any file matching .env.* UNLESS explicitly allowed (see below)
Allowed Alternatives
- .env.example (safe — contains placeholder values, no real secrets)
- .env.sample (safe — documentation template)
- .env.template (safe — schema/structure reference)
Prohibited Output Patterns
NEVER write these to .squad/ files:
| Pattern Type | Examples | Regex Pattern (for scanning) |
|--------------|----------|-------------------------------|
| API Keys | OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-proj-..., GITHUB_TOKEN=ghp_... | [A-Z_]+(?:KEY|TOKEN|SECRET)=[^\s]+ |
| Passwords | DB_PASSWORD=super_secret_123, password: "..." | (?:PASSWORD|PASS|PWD)[:=]\s*["']?[^\s"']+ |
| Connection Strings | postgres://user:pass@host:5432/db, Server=...;Password=... | (?:postgres|mysql|mongodb)://[^@]+@|(?:Server|Host)=.*(?:Password|Pwd)= |
| JWT Tokens | eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9... | eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+ |
| Private Keys | -----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----, -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- | -----BEGIN [A-Z ]+PRIVATE KEY----- |
| AWS Credentials | AKIA..., aws_secret_access_key=... | AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}|aws_secret_access_key=[^\s]+ |
| Email Addresses | [email protected] (PII violation per team decision) | [a-zA-Z0-9._%+-]+@[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+\.[a-zA-Z]{2,} |
Scribe Pre-Commit Validation
Before committing .squad/ changes, Scribe MUST:
- Scan all staged files for secret patterns (use regex table above)
- Check for prohibited file names (don't commit
.env even if manually staged)
- If secrets detected:
- STOP the commit (do NOT proceed)
- Remove the file from staging:
git reset HEAD <file>
- Report to user:
🚨 SECRET DETECTED — commit blocked
File: .squad/decisions/inbox/river-db-config.md
Pattern: DATABASE_URL=postgres://user:password@localhost:5432/prod
This file contains credentials and MUST NOT be committed.
Please remove the secret, replace with placeholder, and try again.
- Exit with error (never silently skip)
Remediation — If a Secret Was Already Committed
If you discover a secret in git history:
- STOP immediately — do not make more commits
- Alert the user:
🚨 CREDENTIAL LEAK DETECTED
A secret was found in git history:
Commit: abc1234
File: .squad/decisions/inbox/agent-config.md
Pattern: API_KEY=sk-proj-...
This requires immediate remediation:
1. Revoke the exposed credential (regenerate API key, rotate password)
2. Remove from git history (git filter-repo or BFG)
3. Force-push the cleaned history
Do NOT proceed with new work until this is resolved.
- Do NOT attempt to fix it yourself — secret removal requires specialized tools
- Wait for user confirmation before resuming work
Quick Start
Use the policy to enforce secret handling.
