security-threat-model

Repository-grounded threat modeling analyzes application security by enumerating trust boundaries, assets, and abuse paths anchored directly to codebase evidence. It avoids generic checklists by validating assumptions against repository files to produce specific, actionable risk assessments.

To generate a threat model, request analysis of the target repository or subpath and confirm assumptions when prompted. The process enumerates entry points and attacker capabilities, then outputs a Mermaid diagram and a final Markdown threat-model file.

Yes, this approach suits application security audits by producing prioritized risks with likelihood and impact reasoning. It requires access to repository files to anchor claims and generate concrete mitigation recommendations tied to code or config locations.

The best way to document attack surfaces is using a strict prompt template that outputs a compact Mermaid diagram alongside a Markdown file. This ensures repeatable, evidence-backed mapping of attacker capabilities and mitigations to specific repository locations.

Threat modeling fails to produce actionable mitigations when it relies on generic checklists and unsupported assumptions instead of repository evidence. Grounding the analysis in actual codebase files ensures mitigations are tied to concrete code or config locations.

Security threat modeling requires access to repository files and provided prompt templates to anchor claims. You can target the full repository or a specific project subpath, ensuring the analysis remains scoped to the in-scope codebase components.