threat-model:sno

To map an SNO pull request to security threats, parse the PR input, retrieve the diff, and apply STRIDE per affected DFD element. The analysis links code changes to the SNO DFD catalog and maps findings to MITRE ATT&CK and OWASP references.

STRIDE threat modeling for SNO installer workflows links PR diffs to an SNO DFD element catalog covering trust boundaries and code paths. It identifies configuration tampering and credential-handling risks, cross-referencing them with MITRE ATT&CK and OWASP controls.

Yes, automated threat modeling validates assisted-service credential-handling risks by scanning PR diffs using ShellCheck-driven pattern scanning. It evaluates security-relevant code paths and maps identified vulnerabilities to standardized MITRE ATT&CK and OWASP technique references.

Yes, SNO threat modeling supports optional cross-referencing with a formal SNO threat model. It appends a PR-scoped findings block to a SNO MITRE findings file, enabling cumulative tracking of security threats across multiple pull requests.

The best way to analyze bootstrap-in-place security exposure is applying STRIDE to PR diffs that affect SNO-specific trust boundaries. This maps single-member etcd exposure risks to MITRE ATT&CK techniques and OWASP controls for actionable mitigation tracking.

Automated SNO PR threat modeling is limited to pull requests affecting SNO-specific DFD elements, trust boundaries, and security-relevant code paths in installer and assisted-service workflows. It requires PR input parsing and ShellCheck-driven pattern scanning to function correctly.