type-juggling

Identify PHP type juggling vulnerabilities and magic hash bypasses.

96|1|Updated Jun 4, 2026
One-click install
npx skills add https://github.com/langbyyi/CyberStrikeAI-SRC --skill type-juggling-langbyyi
Or copy as Structured Prompt for Agent
Please help me install this Agent Skill.
Skill: type-juggling
Source: https://github.com/langbyyi/CyberStrikeAI-SRC/tree/main/skills/type-juggling
Command: npx skills add https://github.com/langbyyi/CyberStrikeAI-SRC --skill type-juggling-langbyyi

SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION & REQUIREMENTS

What problem does it solve?

This Skill solves the challenge of identifying and exploiting PHP type juggling vulnerabilities, weak loose comparison flaws, and magic hash bypasses that are common in legacy PHP applications, CTF challenges, and authentication or token validation logic that uses non-strict equality checks instead of secure comparison functions.

Core Features & Use Cases

  • Cross-version PHP loose comparison reference: Includes detailed truth tables for PHP 5.x, 7.x, and 8.x to account for version-specific type coercion behavior during security testing.
  • Magic hash exploitation guidance: Provides precomputed MD5 and SHA-1 magic hash pairs, plus brute-forcing strategies for longer hash algorithms, to exploit hash comparison flaws in authentication and signature validation flows.
  • CTF and real-world attack pattern coverage: Documents common bypass techniques including strcmp array argument bypass, intval type coercion, json_decode associative array bypass, and HMAC loose comparison attacks for use in authorized penetration tests, CTF competitions, and legacy PHP security audits.
  • Practical use case: Test a legacy PHP admin portal that validates session tokens via md5($_GET['token']) == $stored_hash by generating valid magic hash payloads to bypass authentication without knowing the legitimate token value.

Quick Start

Use the type-juggling skill to generate valid magic hash payloads to bypass the loose MD5 comparison check in the target PHP 7 login endpoint at https://lab.example.com/login.

Frequently Asked Questions about type-juggling

High-intent search queries and answers about installing and using this skill.

FAQPage Schema
How does PHP type juggling bypass authentication in loose comparison checks?

PHP type juggling bypass exploits loose equality operators that coerce types before comparing, allowing magic hash collisions or false-positive matches to bypass authentication and token validation in legacy PHP applications.

What is a PHP magic hash collision and how is it used for security testing?

A PHP magic hash collision occurs when a hash output starts with '0e' followed by digits, which loose comparison treats as scientific notation equaling zero. This allows security testers to bypass vulnerable MD5 or SHA-1 validation checks.

How do I bypass strcmp and intval checks during a PHP penetration test?

To bypass strcmp and intval checks during a PHP penetration test, you supply array arguments to strcmp to return NULL, or exploit intval type coercion behavior to manipulate non-strict validation logic in legacy PHP code.

Do PHP type juggling vulnerabilities behave differently across PHP 5.x, 7.x, and 8.x?

PHP type juggling vulnerabilities behave differently across PHP 5.x, 7.x, and 8.x due to version-specific type coercion changes, requiring security testers to reference cross-version loose comparison truth tables to predict exploitation outcomes accurately.

Can I use magic hash payloads to bypass HMAC loose comparison in CTF challenges?

Yes, you can use magic hash payloads to bypass HMAC loose comparison in CTF challenges by generating values that produce hash outputs matching the '0e' scientific notation pattern, tricking the non-strict equality check.

How do I exploit json_decode associative array bypass in PHP security audits?

You exploit the json_decode associative array bypass in PHP security audits by passing structured JSON input that decodes into an array, manipulating weak comparison logic to return true and bypass authentication validation.