constant-time-analysis

To find timing side-channel vulnerabilities, analyze compiled assembly or bytecode for variable-time instructions and secret-dependent branches. This process detects dangerous operations like division and floating-point math that may leak secret information through execution time.

A timing attack measures execution time to leak secret cryptographic data. Variable-time code causes these leaks when CPU instructions like division or conditional branches take different durations depending on secret values, allowing attackers to infer the data.

Yes, you can check for secret-dependent branches across different CPU architectures like ARM64 and x86_64. Cross-architecture analysis flags dangerous conditional branches and variable-time instructions to ensure code is resistant regardless of the target platform.

Yes, constant-time analysis supports multiple programming languages including Rust, Go, C, C++, PHP, JavaScript, Python, Ruby, Java, C#, and Swift. It examines the compiled output to identify timing vulnerabilities across these different environments.

The best way to ensure an encryption algorithm is resistant to timing attacks is to analyze its compiled code for variable-time instructions and secret-dependent branches. This identifies dangerous operations like division or conditional logic before deployment.

CPU instructions that cause timing side-channel vulnerabilities include division, floating-point math, and conditional branches. When these variable-time instructions depend on secret data, they leak information by varying execution time based on the secret values.