constant-time-analysis

Detect timing side-channel vulnerabilities by analyzing compiled assembly or bytecode for variable-time instructions, such as division and modulo, that leak secret keys through execution time variations in cryptographic implementations.

Timing side-channel leaks are caused by variable-time instructions and secret-dependent branches, such as early-exit comparisons, which allow attackers to observe execution time differences and extract bits of a private key.

Yes, you can scan Rust and Go code, along with C, C++, Java, Kotlin, C#, PHP, JavaScript, TypeScript, Python, and Ruby, by analyzing the compiled output for dangerous instructions that violate constant-time programming requirements.

Check signature verification functions by scanning the implementation for division operations and secret-dependent branches that do not execute in constant time, ensuring no bits of the private key are leaked through timing variations.

The best way to find secret-dependent branches is using static analysis to flag dangerous variable-time instructions in the compiled assembly, providing specific remediation patterns to satisfy constant-time security requirements.

Yes, constant-time analysis supports a wide range of both compiled languages like C, C++, and Rust, and interpreted languages like Python and Ruby, by examining the underlying assembly or bytecode for secret-dependent operations.