game-theory-coalition

Name: game-theory-coalition
Availability: InStock
Author: human-avatar

Compute Shapley value allocations and verify core stability for player coalitions.

212|23|Updated May 23, 2026

Search Tags:#stability analysis #coalition formation #shapley value #fair division #cooperative game theory #core allocation #equity split

Ready to run

npx skills add https://github.com/human-avatar/skills-for-humanity --skill game-theory-coalition

💬 Prompt for ChatGPT / Claude Chat▼

Please help me install this Agent Skill.
Skill: game-theory-coalition
Source: https://github.com/human-avatar/skills-for-humanity/tree/main/skills/game-theory-coalition
Command: npx skills add https://github.com/human-avatar/skills-for-humanity --skill game-theory-coalition

SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION & REQUIREMENTS

What problem does it solve?

This Skill helps you determine which coalition partnerships are likely to form and how to divide the resulting gains fairly and stably.

Core Features & Use Cases

Coalition stability analysis: Test whether the core exists by checking blocking constraints for every relevant subset of players.
Fair allocation via Shapley value: Compute each player’s fair share as the average marginal contribution across possible coalition-formation orders.
Decision-ready structure: Produce a practical output that separates “what is fair” (Shapley) from “what is stable” (core), then identifies the highest-risk defection threats.

Quick Start

Use game-theory-coalition to analyze coalition formation and propose a Shapley-based fair allocation that also accounts for whether the core is empty or stable given your player set and coalition values.

Frequently Asked Questions about game-theory-coalition

High-intent search queries and answers about installing and using this skill.

FAQPage Schema

How do I calculate the Shapley value for a fair equity split?▼

Coalition stability analysis checks whether the core exists by verifying that no subset of players can form a profitable blocking coalition. If the core is empty, the proposed allocation faces high defection threats from stakeholders.

How do I set up a characteristic function for cooperative game theory?▼

Setting up a characteristic function requires defining v(S) to assign a value to every possible subset of players. This function captures the total gain each coalition can achieve through binding agreements and serves as the input for stability and fairness calculations.

Does the Shapley value guarantee a stable coalition formation outcome?▼

The Shapley value does not guarantee a stable coalition formation outcome. It separates what is fair from what is stable; a Shapley allocation can still fall outside the core, meaning blocking coalitions could defect despite the fair division.

What is the best way to divide alliance budgeting gains among multiple stakeholders?▼

The best way to divide alliance budgeting gains is to calculate Shapley marginal contributions for fairness and then verify core stability constraints. This identifies whether the division is stable or highlights the highest-risk defection threats.