security-threat-model

Threat modeling for a code repository involves identifying primary assets, trust boundaries, and entry points to map untrusted data flows. This process anchors architectural claims to actual repo evidence, generating a prioritized list of threats with concrete abuse paths and mitigations.

Mapping trust boundaries in AppSec requires identifying components, runtimes, and data stores to track how untrusted data enters and is processed. By analyzing data types crossing these boundaries, you can enumerate concrete abuse paths and prioritize risks effectively.

Generating concrete mitigations involves analyzing repository components and data stores to identify where untrusted data is processed. This yields prioritized threats with specific abuse paths, allowing you to map mitigations directly to repository locations and components.

Yes, threat modeling can use repo evidence to avoid generic risk checklists by anchoring architectural claims to actual code. This approach maps runtimes and data stores to depict untrusted data processing, producing a prioritized threat list supported by repository locations.

Prioritizing threats involves mapping runtimes and data stores to identify data types crossing trust boundaries. This analysis highlights where untrusted data enters and is processed, enabling risk prioritization of threats with concrete abuse paths and explicit assumptions.

You trigger a threat model workflow for AppSec analysis when you need to identify primary assets, trust boundaries, and entry points within a repository. It maps untrusted data flows and provides a prioritized list of threats supported by repo evidence and explicit assumptions.