threat-modeler

To create a threat model before implementation, enumerate system assets, define actors, map trust boundaries, apply STRIDE threat analysis, develop abuse cases, rank risks, and map mitigations to negative tests.

STRIDE threat analysis identifies spoofing, tampering, repudiation, information disclosure, denial of service, and elevation of privilege risks across trust boundaries. Apply it during security design reviews for sensitive features like authentication, uploads, or payments.

Map security mitigations to negative tests by converting credible STRIDE threats into concrete attacker abuse cases with explicit payoff, then design validation tests that confirm each mitigation blocks the identified exploit path.

Yes, this threat modeling approach applies to tenant isolation and admin tooling designs by enumerating trust boundaries and actor permissions, identifying abuse cases for privilege escalation, and ranking risks specific to multi-tenant boundaries.

Rank security risks during a design review by evaluating each STRIDE threat's exploit path feasibility and system impact, then prioritizing threats tied to critical trust boundary transitions such as authentication or payment processing.

Yes, threat modeling supports post-incident sibling attack path analysis by re-examining existing trust boundaries and asset mappings to identify related exploit paths and generate targeted mitigations and negative tests.