sdlc-threat-model

Applies STRIDE lenses to one bound trust boundary and emits evidence-graded findings reports.

Updated Jun 30, 2026
One-click install
npx skills add https://github.com/Codeseys-Labs/agentic-sdlc --skill sdlc-threat-model-codeseys-labs
Or copy as Structured Prompt for Agent
Please help me install this Agent Skill.
Skill: sdlc-threat-model
Source: https://github.com/Codeseys-Labs/agentic-sdlc/tree/main/plugin/skills/sdlc-threat-model
Command: npx skills add https://github.com/Codeseys-Labs/agentic-sdlc --skill sdlc-threat-model-codeseys-labs

SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION & REQUIREMENTS

💡 This Skill includes references (resource) components.

What problem does it solve? Changes that create, move, or delete trust boundaries often ship without structured threat analysis, leaving residual risks unnamed and unowned. This Skill runs a disciplined STRIDE threat-modeling pass over exactly one scoped subject and produces a classified, evidence-graded findings report without ever fixing code or authorizing anything. ## Core Features & Use Cases - Bound-subject analysis: Binds one diff, subsystem, or trust boundary as an immutable snapshot before any lens fires, refusing whole-repository scans. - Six STRIDE lenses: Runs spoofing, tampering, repudiation, information disclosure, denial of service, and elevation-of-privilege lenses with a per-element coverage vocabulary (applicable, not_applicable, deferred, out_of_scope). - Structured findings report: Emits seed-shaped findings with severity, STRIDE letters, evidence classes, acceptance criteria, and a human-only risk disposition column. - Use Case: Before accepting a change that touches credential handling, run the skill against that diff to enumerate spoofing and information-disclosure threats, then hand the report to a human for risk disposition. ## Quick Start Ask the agent to threat-model the current diff touching the authentication boundary using the sdlc-threat-model skill and return the findings report.

Frequently Asked Questions about sdlc-threat-model

High-intent search queries and answers about installing and using this skill.

FAQPage Schema
How do I run a STRIDE threat model on a code change?

Bind exactly one subject first — one diff, one subsystem, or one trust boundary — as an immutable snapshot with its commit or digest recorded. Then run the six STRIDE lenses over each subject element and emit the findings report with coverage tables and evidence classes.

What is the difference between threat modeling and secure code review?

Threat modeling enumerates what threatens a trust boundary using STRIDE lenses and reports findings without fixing anything. Generic secure code review belongs to reviewer or critic lenses, and complexity audits belong to separate review skills — this skill explicitly rejects both neighbors.

Can this skill scan the whole repository for vulnerabilities?

No. Whole-repository scans are refused with an offer to scope one boundary, subsystem, or diff. It also consumes no CVE or vulnerability feeds and performs no dependency scanning, penetration testing, or compliance audit.

Does a threat model report block commits or CI pipelines?

No. The skill is advisory and never a gate leaf: it is not reachable from repository gates, git hooks, or CI, and no policy may make a run's outcome block a commit. A completed run never means the system is secure.

Who can accept or dismiss a threat finding?

Only a human writes risk dispositions such as accepted, deferred, or dismissed, with rationale and identity. Agents may draft a proposed disposition clearly labeled as a proposal; any agent-written disposition is treated as a defect.

What happens after a finding is mitigated?

Mitigation of an accepted finding is an ordinary authorized workstream, but verification requires a new run by a different actor against the new snapshot. A mitigated subject is re-reviewed, never waved through, and implemented never implies verified.